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A comprehensive definition of location authentication and a review of its 
threats and possible solutions help provide a better understanding of this 
young security requirement.
N ew and enhanced location-determination technologies have allowed ubiquitous com-puting applications to better exploit location information. 
In particular, these technologies have improved 
location-based services, such as emergency and 
navigation services, tracking and monitoring 
systems, and location-based billing services. 
They also apply to more specific contexts—for 
example, in sensor networks, location infor-
mation is often crucial for node tracking and 
packet routing.
This increasing use of loca-
tion information has driven 
researchers to analyze its spe-
cific security requirements.1 
The most important require-
ments relate to privacy and 
trust, including authenticity 
and attestation. Here, we focus 
on authenticating location information, which 
is necessary when using such information to 
grant access to a service or to generate evidence 
such as a certificate guaranteeing an entity’s 
location at some point in time. It’s also useful 
for accountable tracking of nodes and billing of 
mobile services. More important, for some ser-
vices—such as emergency related services—fail-
ing to guarantee location information can have 
fatal consequences. 
Location authentication is still a relatively 
young security property. Stefan Brands and Da-
vid Chaum first addressed location authentica-
tion in 1994,2 followed by Dorothy Denning and 
Peter MacDoran in 1996.3 Researchers have since 
increased their efforts to understand location au-
thentication, proposing several solutions for dif-
ferent contexts. Despite the recent advances, we 
still need a clearer picture of this property. Here, 
we extend a survey we published in 20054 to pro-
vide a more comprehensive definition of location 
authentication and to describe its main threats in 
different scenarios. We also give an overview of 
proposed mechanisms for fulfilling this require-
ment, taking into account not only location veri-
fication but also the related problem of secure 
location determination.
Location determination
We start with a brief overview of location deter-
mination because of its obvious importance to 
location authentication. One main approach to 
location determination is to use an object’s in-
ternal measurements, such as inertial navigation 
or odometry techniques. However, the more 
common approach in ubiquitous computing is 
to use a reference system that exploits triangula-
tion, proximity, or scene-analysis techniques.5
Typically, reference-based location determina-
tion considers the exchange of signals between 
a target node (the one being located) and a set 
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of reference nodes. Reference nodes are 
part of a location-determination infra-
structure, and they usually either know 
their location because it’s fixed or can 
easily determine it. 
Reference-based location determi-
nation uses either range-dependent or 
range-independent techniques. Range-
dependent techniques measure specific 
properties of the exchanged signals—
properties that depend on the distance 
between the nodes. Usually, these tech-
niques rely on the signal’s angle of ar-
rival, the received signal strength (RSS), 
and the propagation time. Range- 
independent techniques don’t measure 
signal property; they use other charac-
teristics to determine proximity. For ex-
ample, they might receive information 
that the reference nodes (beacons) have 
broadcast, count the number of hops a 
message must go through, or identify 
their location through physical contact 
with other nodes.
Reference-based location determina-
tion also relies on a wireless communi-
cation network that’s either infrastruc-
ture-based (for example, based on a 
satellite, cellular, or RFID system) or 
ad hoc (for example, based on sensor 
networks). Additionally, it considers 
the number of reference nodes involved 
and the kind of signal used (mainly ra-
dio and infrared electromagnetic sig-
nals or ultrasound signals). Finally, ref-
erence-based location determination 
also considers who estimates the loca-
tion. In terminal-based schemes, the 
target node computes its own location, 
and in infrastructure-based schemes, 
other nodes, mainly reference nodes, 
compute the node’s location. Moreover, 
it could consider who collects the data 
for computing the location in addition 
to who performs the computation, but 
this is less common.
Location authentication
Authentication is widely known in its two 
major facets. Entity authentication helps 
corroborate the veracity of a claimed 
or presumed party’s identity. Data- 
origin authentication verifies a message’s 
source.6 Location authentication assures 
the truthfulness of the claimed or pre-
sumed location information. 
The location-authentication schemes 
we address here use reference-based lo-
cation determination, so they consider 
the located node’s information to estab-
lish its truthfulness. Reference nodes 
are also involved in location-authentica-
tion schemes, and sometimes a central 
authority (which might or might not be 
a reference node) is involved as well.
Because location authentication is 
a novel security service, the academic 
community has yet to agree on a com-
mon definition. In 2001, Tim Kindberg 
and Kan Zhang proposed a theoretical 
framework for context authentication 
using context-constrained channels.7 
They defined location authentication as 
the process in which an entity claims 
its location and that location is veri-
fied. However, the concept has since 
evolved to also include secure location 
determination. 
Location verification
Researchers now commonly refer to 
Kindberg and Zhang’s definition of lo-
cation authentication as location veri-
fication,8 emphasizing that the goal is 
to verify a claimant node’s location. In 
our setting, the claimant is the target 
node, and one or more reference nodes 
or a central authority play the verifier 
role.
Researchers are addressing differ-
ent variants of the location-verification 
problem, using three approaches:
Distance bounding. This verifies that 
the claimant’s distance from a certain 
verifier has an upper bound (that is, 
the claimant is closer to the verifier 
than some distance). 
•
In region. In this approach, the pro-
tocols, which are usually built on 
distance-bounding schemes, verify 
that the claimant is inside a certain 
delimited region. 
Absolute location. Here, the proto-
cols—also built on distance-bound-
ing schemes, generally in combination 
with triangulation techniques—must 
verify the nodes’ absolute location.
These approaches can use range- 
dependent or range-independent tech-
niques and are usually infrastructure 
based. (We distinguish between infra-
structure- and terminal-based schemes 
according to which entity or entities 
perform the location authentication, 
not the location estimation.)
Secure location determination
Secure location determination aims to 
not only determine a target node’s loca-
tion but also provide some guarantee 
about the location estimation’s authen-
ticity. Secure location determination 
thus addresses the authenticity of loca-
tion information but emphasizes that 
the location information is unknown 
before the execution of the location-
determination protocol.
Secure-location-determination pro-
tocols can be infrastructure or terminal 
based, as well as range dependent or 
range independent. The settings for some 
infrastructure-based location-determi-
nation protocols are similar to those of 
absolute-location-verification protocols, 
except that the location information is 
known or presumed beforehand. 
redefining   
location authentication
Taking into account location veri-
fication and secure location deter-
mination, we propose the following 
•
•
because	location	authentication	is	a	novel	
security	service,	the	academic	community		
has	yet	to	agree	on	a	common	definition.	
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TABLE 1 
Range-dependent location verification and determination.
Location-
authentication 
property Approach Proposal
Location- 
determination 
technique
No. of  
reference 
nodes 
Network  
or system  
support Signal used
location		
verification	
(infrastructure-
based)
Distance	
bound
Distance-bounding		
protocols2
toA*		
(round	trip)
1 Contactless	
access-control	
cards
Signals	with	light-
propagation	speed
Secure	and	private	
proofs	of	location—
proximity-	proving		
protocol9
toA		
(round	trip)
1 Wireless	local	
area	network
radio
Distance-bounding 
proof	of	knowledge10
toA		
(round	trip)
1 Contact-based	
devices
Optical	or	electrical
rFID	distance-		
bounding	protocol11
toA		
(round	trip)
1 rFID	tokens	such	
as	contactless	
smartcards
radio	(ultra-wideband	
communication
Symmetric	key-based	
distance-bounding		
protocol12
toA		
(round	trip)
1 rFID	tokens	such	
as	contactless	
smartcards
Heat	and	electro-
magnetic	emanations	
(side-channel	leakage)
In	region Secure	verification		
of	location	claims13
toA		
(round	trip)
multiple	(accep-
tors)—only	one	
executes	the	
protocol
Sensor	and		
wireless		
networks
radio	and		
ultrasound
Absolute	
location
location-based		
authentication		
system3
location		
signatures		
(specific	differ-
ential	GpS)
multiple		
(all	in	view)
Satellite	network	
(GpS)
radio
Secure	and	private	
proofs	of	location—
absolute-position		
verification9
toA		
(round	trip)
multiple Wireless	local	
area	networks
radio
Verifiable		
multilateration14
toA		
(round	trip)
multiple Wireless		
networks
radio
location		
determination
Infrastruc-
ture	based
trusted	GNSS†		
receivers15
toA		
(one	way
multiple Satellite	network	
(GNSS)
radio
Asymmetric	security	
mechanism	for		
navigation	signals16
toA		
(one	way)
multiple Satellite	network	
(GNSS)
radio
Secure	positioning	
with	direct	sensor	
positioning14
toA		
(round	trip)
multiple Sensor	networks radio
terminal	
based
Attack	resistant	mini-
mum-mean-square	
location	estimation17
Compatible	
techniques	
(such	as	rSSI‡)
multiple Sensor	networks radio
Voting-based	location	
estimation17
Compatible	
techniques	
(such	as	rSSI)
multiple Sensor	networks radio
robust	statistical	
method	for	triangula-
tion18
Any	range-
dependent	
technique
multiple Sensor	networks radio
Secure	positioning	in	
sensor	networks14
toA	(round	
trip)
multiple Sensor	networks radio
* Time of arrival, † Global Navigation Satellite System, ‡ Received signal strength indication
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definition (based partly on Alfred J. 
Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, and 
Scoot A. Vanstone’s definition of entity 
authentication6): 
Location authentication is the 
process whereby one party is 
assured (through acquisition 
of corroborative evidence) of 
a second party’s location in a 
protocol, and the second party 
must have participated in the 
protocol (that is, was active 
when or immediately before the 
evidence was acquired).4
Most researchers assume that they 
can’t separate location authentica-
tion from entity authentication as we 
have done. Additionally, some believe 
they can treat both properties inde-
pendently,7 and others view location 
authentication as an alternative to 
the traditional entity-authentication 
proofs based on something you have, 
know, and are. We assume that loca-
tion authentication requires entity au-
thentication unless explicitly stated 
otherwise. However, authenticating 
a device’s location doesn’t make any 
guarantees about the user who is con-
trolling that device, and even the infor-
mation is guaranteed only during the 
location authentication process. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview 
of approaches and techniques for range-
dependent and -independent location 
verification and determination.
underlying location-  
determination techniques
Most range-dependent location-au-
thentication protocols are built on 
time-based location determination 
techniques; the rest use RSS techniques. 
Time-based techniques estimate the dis-
tance between two nodes using a signal 
with a relatively constant propagation 
speed to transmit messages. Then, the 
time a message sent by one node takes 
to reach the other node (one-way time) 
is measured, or the time for the first 
node to receive a response to its mes-
sage from the other node (round-trip 
time) is measured. The total latency 
usually includes the nodes’ processing 
time, though it’s considered negligible 
in most cases. Satellite-based systems 
also use differential techniques (differ-
ential GPS) to enhance location-estima-
tion precision by mitigating undesirable 
deviations in the satellite signals (these 
deviations are estimated by nodes that 
know their own location).
RSS-based techniques use a signal 
that’s altered depending on its trav-
elled distance. Some location-authen-
tication settings use RSS indication, 
which estimates distance directly from 
the attenuation.  
Most range-independent location-
authentication schemes use proximity-
based techniques, which assume that 
if a node broadcasts a message, only 
other nodes close to the transmitting 
node (within its range) will receive the 
message.
In all these techniques, when three or 
more reference nodes are involved, tri-
angulation can be applied to estimate 
an absolute position. Figure 1 shows 
an overview of the location-authentica-
tion settings we’ve identified according 
to their underlying location-estimation 
technique. 
Location-authentication 
threat models
Only a few location-authentication 
schemes have been industrially de-
ployed,3,15 so the threat models re-
searchers have addressed are some-
what theoretical. After analyzing 
most location-authentication schemes, 
we’ve identified two different threat 
models. The first applies to infrastruc-
ture-based location-authentication 
schemes; the second one to terminal-
based schemes.
Both models usually consider the 
attacker to be an active adversary. 
The attacker can capture, record, in- 
tercept, replay, or insert any mes-
sage in the communication medium 
using any kind of signal. We call the 
TABLE 2 
Range-independent location verification and determination.
Location- 
authentication 
property Approach Proposal
Location- 
determination 
technique
No. of  
reference 
nodes 
Network  
or system  
support Signal used
location	verification	
(infrastructure	based)
Distance	
bound
location-	
authentication		
protocols7
proximity		
(in	range)
1 Wireless		
networks
radio	(short-range	
communication	
technology)
In	region Secure	location		
verification	using	radio	
broadcast19
proximity		
(in	range)
multiple		
(acceptors		
and	rejectors)
Sensor		
networks
radio
location	determina-
tion
Infrastruc-
ture	based
Secure	localization	
using	transmission-
rate	variation20
proximity		
(in	range)
multiple Sensor		
networks
radio
terminal	
based
Secure	range-indepen-
dent	localization21
proximity		
(in	range)
multiple Sensor		
networks
radio
Secure	localization	
with	attack	tolerance22
proximity		
(in	range)
multiple Sensor		
networks
radio
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adversary external if the nodes under 
the attacker’s control can’t authenti-
cate correctly to other nodes in the 
system. Otherwise, the adversary is 
internal, in which case the adversary 
will control one or more fraudulent 
nodes (malicious or compromised). 
The difference between malicious 
and compromised nodes is that we 
assume that the attacker can’t ma-
nipulate malicious nodes to access the 
information used for entity authentica-
tion (because it’s stored and processed 
in a tamper-resistant module, for ex-
ample). However, with compromised 
nodes, the adversary will have access 
to the secret keys or authentication 
information. 
the model for   
infrastructure-based schemes
In infrastructure-based schemes, the 
adversary’s goal is to make reference 
nodes incorrectly verify or determine 
the target node’s location at some 
point in time. This goal includes sev-
eral threats that result if one or more of 
the elements in the tuple (id, l, t) is in-
correctly verified or computed—where 
id stands for node identification, l for 
location, and t for time. 
For example, the adversary might try 
to make a verifier believe that a node 
identified as id is at a different loca-
tion l than it really is by using a node 
id placed at l. Then the verifiers might 
think that a different node id is at l. 
Infrastructure-based schemes assume 
that the reference nodes can be trusted 
and that they usually can communicate 
securely with a central authority.
the model for   
terminal-based schemes
In terminal-based schemes, the adver-
sary’s goal is for the target node to in-
correctly compute its own location at 
some moment. In this case, we assume 
that the reference nodes are either mali-
cious or compromised.
attacks and solutions
Researchers are addressing a set of 
known attacks for various location-au-
thentication settings. Most attacks tar-
get the location information, although 
others target the time of the location 
authentication or the located node’s 
identity. Here, we briefly describe 
the attacks (see Table 3) and analyze 
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Figure 1. An overview of location-
authentication settings. The overview 
shows (a) the problem they address, the 
model they follow, and the approach 
and technique used and (b) a diagram 
of each setting, identifying the nodes 
involved and the trustworthiness of 
these elements. (The colors in the 
table indicate similarities between the 
schemes or settings.) 
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how existing location-authentication 
schemes address them.
impersonation 
An external node E or a malicious node 
T* might try to impersonate an honest 
node T to make the reference nodes R 
or the central node C believe that T is 
at target location l when actually E or 
T* is located there. 
To prevent this attack, the scheme 
must authenticate the target node dur-
ing the protocol execution. 
Distance fraud
An attacker controlling a malicious 
target node T* might try to manipu-
late the device or make it so that it no 
longer follows the protocol’s rules and 
thus makes the verifiers believe that 
T* is closer to them than it really is. In 
schemes based on round-trip time of 
arrival (ToA), the adversary might un-
dertake this attack by sending the re-
sponse in advance or manipulating the 
device’s clock speed. In schemes based 
on proximity techniques, the adversary 
might try to guess or reuse the token 
broadcast by the reference nodes or 
manipulate the device so that it has a 
more sensitive receiver or a more pow-
erful transmitter.
Fast challenge-response protocols 
can prevent this attack in round-trip-
TOA-based schemes.2,9–12 Jolyon Clu-
low and his colleagues also suggest a set 
of principles to consider when choosing 
communication protocols and data-
coding formats.23  To avoid a node 
manipulating its processing time, some 
researchers suggest tamper-resistant 
hardware.9 Others propose making 
processing times negligible compared 
to propagation time using specific 
hardware,10 and yet others tighten 
the conditions of the protocol accord-
ing to the processing time the claim-
ant node declares.13 For proximity- 
based schemes, to avoid token reuse 
or guessing, tokens should be unpre-
dictable and bound to a single, specific 
location.7,20
absolute-location fraud
An attacker controlling a malicious 
node T* might try to fake the verifica-
tion or determination of its absolute 
location by manipulating the device or 
make it so that it no longer follows the 
protocol’s rules. Then, reference nodes 
or the central node might believe that 
T* is in a different location than it is. 
In schemes based on multi-lateration, 
the adversary might undertake this at-
tack by making some of the reference 
nodes (falsely) believe that the adver-
sary is farther away than it really is. 
Distance-bounding protocols don’t 
aim to prevent this action. In other 
cases, the adversary might try to ma-
nipulate the node to generate fake re-
ports about its location or manipulate 
the captured signals.  
This attack is prevented in round-
trip-TOA-based techniques if the target 
node is within the polygon or polyhe-
dron formed by the involved reference 
nodes.14 In proximity-based schemes, 
tokens should be unrelated to the dis-
tance they address. This hinders mali-
cious nodes from selecting a coherent 
set of tokens that result in a false lo-
cation estimation.20 Other schemes re-
quire tamper-resistant devices to pre-
vent target nodes from manipulating 
signals received from reference nodes 
or creating fake reports.15
time fraud
In some settings, a malicious node T* 
TABLE 3 
An analysis of the attacks that might be undertaken in each location-authentication setting. 
(The colors indicate similarities between the schemes or settings.)
Attack 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Impersonation X X X X X X X X 	 	
Distance	fraud X X 	 X 	 X 	 	 	 	
Absolute-location	fraud 	 	 X 	 X 	 X X 	 	
time	fraud 	 	 	 X X 	 X X 	 	
mafia	fraud	0 X X X X X X X X X X
mafia	fraud	1 	 	 	 X X 	 X X 	 	
terrorist	fraud	0 X X X X X X X X X X
terrorist	fraud	1 	 	 	 X X 	 X X 	 	
Device	cloning X X X X X X X X 	 	
report	manipulation 	 	 	 X X 	 X X 	 	
Signal	and	data	manipulation 	 	 	 	 	 	 X X X X
Signal	and	data	synthesis 	 	 	 	 	 	 X X X X
Sybil	attack 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 X X
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might try to make the reference nodes 
believe it’s at some location it actually 
left a while ago. In proximity-based 
schemes, the adversary might under-
take this attack by trying to reuse pre-
viously received tokens at the target 
location. 
In proximity-based schemes, tokens 
should be different each time.7,20 Den-
ning and MacDoran propose a similar 
mechanism to guarantee freshness and 
location authentication,3 while others 
rely on tamper resistance.15
Mafia fraud
In the classic version of this attack, 
adapted to location-authentication 
schemes (mafia fraud 0), the adversary 
places one or more malicious nodes T* 
(or R* in terminal-based schemes) act-
ing as a proxy between honest refer-
ence nodes and an honest node T. The 
malicious node T* is placed at the tar-
get location l while T isn’t. The adver-
sary’s goal is to make the reference or 
central nodes (the node T itself in ter-
minal-based schemes) believe that T is 
at l. This attack is also called a worm-
hole attack. 
When the target node interacts with 
a central node in addition to reference 
nodes, the mafia fraud attack can be 
made in a second way (mafia fraud 1). 
In this case, the malicious node T* is 
placed between the honest node T and 
the central node C. T is at the target lo-
cation l while T* isn’t.  The adversary’s 
goal now is to make the central node 
believe that T* is at l.
Avoiding this attack in round-trip-
TOA-based schemes requires using 
signals propagating at a speed that the 
adversary can’t exceed (signals whose 
propagation speed is close to light 
speed).8,10,14 
One way to mitigate the attack in 
proximity-based schemes is to control 
the access to the tokens by encrypt-
ing them with a key shared with the 
intended (honest) target node. Mat-
thew Pirreti and his colleagues pro-
pose a similar mechanism that uses 
cluster keys shared only between the 
nodes close to the reference nodes.22 
Other researchers suggest the careful 
design of reference-node deployment 
combined with specific requirements 
such as the use of rejector nodes19 
or sectorized antennas.21 In another 
mechanism, the reference nodes use 
high-bandwidth signals3 or the target 
node performs noncryptographic vali-
dations to detect whether the signal 
has been relayed.15
terrorist fraud
This set of attacks (terrorist fraud 0 
and 1) is similar to mafia fraud attacks 
except that all participating nodes are 
malicious. So, the node that was hon-
est in mafia fraud attacks now col-
ludes with the other malicious nodes if 
there’s some authentication operation 
is involved. 
To avoid this attack, the message that 
the target node sends must be bound to 
itself (using message authentication, for 
example) and its contents protected to 
avoid an adversary reusing them (such 
as through encryption).15
Device cloning
If the adversary controls and has cloned 
a compromised node, it’s easy to make 
reference or central nodes believe that 
the node exists at a fake location.
This attack is difficult to prevent, 
but tamper resistance and device-fin-
gerprinting techniques can help.
report manipulation
The infrastructure-based schemes that 
have the target node reporting infor-
mation to a central node might suffer 
from this attack. The adversary might 
try to manipulate the report that an 
honest target node T sends to make 
the central node believe T is at an in-
correct location.
Message authentication mechanisms 
can help prevent this attack.
Signal and data synthesis
An adversary might try to imperson-
ate reference nodes to subvert location 
authentication protocols. This attack is 
easy to undertake using current public 
GPS signals.
To prevent this attack, a target node 
should be able to authenticate the sig-
nals received from reference nodes—or 
at least the data they carry.15
Signal and data manipulation
In satellite-based schemes, the signal’s 
ToA is very important. An attacker 
might manipulate the signals and the 
data they carry to selectively delay the 
signals’ ToA to an honest target node, 
which will therefore incorrectly esti-
mate the target node’s location. 
Message authentication mecha-
nisms sometimes detect of this kind of 
attack. However, satellite-based sys-
tems must include more specific mech-
anisms that can detect attacks that se-
lectively delay the signal or manipulate 
its deviations.15,16
Sybil attack
In this attack, the adversary controls 
several compromised reference nodes 
R*, which collude to broadcast or send 
erroneous information to make the 
target node T determine T’s location 
incorrectly.
Once reference nodes have been com-
promised, target nodes can mitigate 
this attack using mechanisms that try 
to detect the fraudulent reference nodes 
to eliminate their influence in the loca-
tion estimation.14,17,18 
Practical issues
Analyzing how the proposed solutions 
mitigate the threats to location authen-
tication is insufficient; we must also 
analyze the difficulty and cost of imple-
menting the mechanisms in the context 
of a particular application to assess its 
suitability.
Generally, proximity-based schemes 
are more affordable7,19,21,22 and, if de-
signed carefully, might stop an attacker 
that has reasonable capabilities. Other 
affordable and interesting schemes are 
those that don’t aim to prevent attacks 
at all cost but let the target node com-
pute its location successfully with cer-
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tain guarantees, given that the number 
of fraudulent nodes is limited.17,18 
The stronger schemes are usually 
more expensive to implement10,11,14,16 
and might be adequate only for high-
security applications. When analyzing 
the risk, you need to consider the ad-
versaries’ resources and the differing 
contexts. For example, a weak adver-
sary might be able to undertake attacks 
(for example, mafia fraud and signal 
synthesis attacks) in certain contexts 
but might require numerous resources 
to overcome other attacks. 
L ocation authentication will receive increasing attention in ubiquitous computing. As we’ve learned, proposals de-
signed for different contexts converge, 
and designing and implementing location- 
authentication mechanisms isn’t easy. 
On the one hand, range-dependent 
time-based mechanisms are generally 
more secure against powerful adversar-
ies, but they usually impose hardware 
and software requirements that aren’t 
always easy to fulfil. On the other hand, 
robust statistical methods allow the 
provision of some guarantees to range-
independent schemes without the strict 
hardware and software requirements. 
Although we focused on how the 
schemes address location authentica-
tion, we now must further study other 
parameters such as privacy guarantees, 
efficiency, hardware and synchroniza-
tion requirements, and resilience to 
communication errors.
Several big challenges lie ahead 
for location-authentication research-
ers—mainly, building competitive 
commercial implementations of the 
mechanisms that can withstand at-
tacks at an affordable cost. We must 
also develop formal methods for ana-
lyzing the mechanisms used to provide 
security guarantees.24 We’ll also need 
to integrate the authentication of a us-
er’s proximity to the located devices 
to improve the integrity of existing or 
new mechanisms used in this field.
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